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“EXCLUSIVE” JURISDICTION IN DELAWARE’S GENERAL 
CORPORATION LAW: WHY STATES LACK THE POWER TO 
STRIP JURISDICTION FROM THEIR SISTER STATES AND 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Michael V. Caracappa* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Delaware has carved out a niche for itself as a corporate haven.1  The 
State Legislature has done this by taxing corporations at comparatively lower 
rates and enacting laws more favorable to corporations than its sister states.2  
The State also maintains separate courts of equity, the Delaware Chancery 
Courts, which are distinct from the State’s courts of law.3  That division has 
allowed Chancery Court judges to gain expertise in corporate matters, 
making the Chancery Court an attractive forum for corporate litigation.4  
Because of those benefits, among others, most corporations choose to 
incorporate in Delaware.5  In fact, sixty-six percent of all Fortune 500 
companies are incorporated in the State.6 
Despite this, it is not uncommon for corporate litigation to arise in 
forums outside of Delaware.7  While most Fortune 500 companies are 
 
* J.D., 2018, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Political Science and Jurisprudence, 
Montclair State University.  I would like to thank my parents for their endless support.   
 1  Jane Haskins, Incorporating in Delaware: Advantages and Disadvantages, 
LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/incorporating-in-delaware-advantages-
and-disadvantages (last visited April 23, 2019). 
 2  Id. 
 3  Id. 
 4  Id. 
 5  See Why Incorporate in Delaware or Nevada?, BIZFILINGS, 
https://www.bizfilings.com/toolkit/research-topics/incorporating-your-business/why-
incorporate-in-delaware-or-nevada (last visited April 23, 2019). 
 6  JEFFREY W. BULLOCK, DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, DELAWARE DIVISION 
OF CORPORATIONS 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2015), 
https://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2015%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
 7  E.g., Daniel Fisher, West Virginia Tops List of Worst States for Litigation 2015, 
FORBES (Sept. 10, 2015, 1:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/09/10/we 
st-virginia-tops-list-of-worst-states-for-litigation-2015/#eeb64a73b522; U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2017 LAWSUIT CLIMATE SURVEY: RANKING THE 
STATES 1, 24–25 (2017), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/pdfs/Harris-2017-
Executive-Summary-FINAL.pdf. 
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incorporated in Delaware, only two are headquartered in the State.8  Most 
states apply the “internal affairs doctrine,” which holds that only one state, 
usually the state of incorporation, should have the authority to regulate a 
corporation’s internal affairs, including the interrelations of a corporation’s 
shareholders, directors, officers, or agents.9  The internal affairs doctrine is 
dominant because it provides certainty and predictability.10  The doctrine 
honors expectations and avoids subjecting corporations to the conflicting 
demands that may result if a single corporation operating in multiple states 
was subject to various competing legal standards.11 
Under early applications of the internal affairs doctrine, state courts 
would deny having subject matter jurisdiction over controversies involving 
the internal affairs of corporations’ incorporation in states other than the 
forum state.12  As clarified by the Supreme Court in 1947, however, the 
 
 8  Caitlin Dempsey, Fortune 1000 Companies List for 2015, GEOLOUNGE (July 25, 
2015), https://www.geolounge.com/fortune-1000-companies-list-for-2015/. 
 9  Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (“The internal affairs doctrine is a 
conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to 
regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among or 
between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders—because 
otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting demands.”); 36 AM. JUR. 2D FOREIGN 
CORPORATIONS § 72, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2018) (“[T]he ‘internal affairs doctrine’ 
posits that only one state, usually the state of incorporation, should have the authority to 
regulate a corporation’s ‘internal affairs,’ i.e., matters that involve the relations inter se of the 
corporation, its shareholders, directors, officers, or agents.”); 9 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 
4223.50, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017) (“Not all jurisdictions follow the internal 
affairs doctrine.”); Jason S. Haller, The Constitutionality of Outreach Statutes Under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 597, 605 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court 
of the United States has never taken the position that the U.S. Constitution mandates the 
internal affairs doctrine.  Indeed, the doctrine dominates the past and present of corporate 
law—courts rarely hesitate to apply it.”). 
 10  36 AM. JUR. 2D FOREIGN CORPORATIONS § 72, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2018). 
 11  Id. 
 12  Langfelder v. Universal Labs., 293 N.Y. 200, 204 (1944) (“[I]t is well settled that 
jurisdiction in any case will be declined . . . where a determination of the rights of litigants 
involves regulation and management of the internal affairs of the corporation dependent upon 
the laws of the foreign State.”); Lapides v. Doner, 248 F. Supp. 883, 885 (E.D. Mich. 1965) 
(citing Wojtczak v. Am. United Ins. Co., 293 Mich. 449, 452 (1940)); Aston v. O’Carroll, 66 
F. Supp. 585, 586 (M.D. Pa. 1946) (“These questions are so manifestly concerned with the 
internal affairs of the defendant company that little room is left for argument.  This court, like 
the state courts of Pennsylvania, does not exercise visitorial powers over foreign corporations 
under such circumstances.”) (citing Hopkins v. Great W. Fuse Co., 343 Pa. 438, 440–41 
(1941)); In re Dohring, 142 Misc. 2d 429, 431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (“An action for 
dissolution is deemed an internal dispute of a corporation.  The older view was that the internal 
affairs of foreign corporations were not to be litigated in courts of a state other than that of 
incorporation.”); DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, Choice of Law Considerations—Internal Affairs and 
Statutory Outreach, in SHAREHOLDER DERIV. ACTIONS L. & PRAC § 2:13 (2017–2018), 
Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2018).  But see Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 
330 U.S. 518, 527 (1947) (“There is no rule of law, moreover, which requires dismissal of a 
suitor from the forum on a mere showing that the trial will involve issues which relate to the 
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internal affairs doctrine is not a rule of law, but a consideration of forum 
convenience.13  Over time, state courts softened their application of the 
internal affairs doctrine,14  and, today, courts will apply the rubric of forum 
non conveniens to determine whether retaining jurisdiction is appropriate.15  
Complications arise in certain cases where the forum state lacks the power 
to grant the petitioned-for relief, like dissolution of the corporation, but this 
only factors into the forum non conveniens analysis.16 
While its importance as a jurisdictional bar has waned, the internal 
affairs doctrine remains an important choice-of-law doctrine,17 often tasking 
foreign states with applying the laws of the state in which the corporation 
was incorporated.18  For example, a New Jersey state court may be asked to 
determine whether an officer of a corporation, incorporated under the laws 
of Delaware, is indemnified by the corporation for claims brought against 
it.19  Or a Massachusetts court may need to determine whether a corporate 
 
internal affairs of a foreign corporation.  That is one, but only one, factor which may show 
convenience of parties or witnesses, the appropriateness of trial in a forum familiar with the 
law of the corporation’s domicile, and the enforceability of the remedy if one be granted.”). 
 13  Koster, 330 U.S. at 527; see also O’Brien v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 206 A.2d 
878, 885 (N.J. 1965) (“The basic question, however, is not one of power to exercise 
jurisdiction but of the wisdom of doing so.  In most situations it is desirable to leave such 
matters to the courts of the state of creation of the corporation.”). 
 14  In re Dohring, 142 Misc. 2d at 432 (“This trend in the direction of expanding 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations was noted by the First Department in New York in 
1964.  While earlier courts had considered themselves jurisdictionally barred from 
entertaining lawsuits involving the internal affairs of foreign corporations, the more recent 
view was to regard the issue as one of convenience and discretion.”) (internal citations 
omitted); e.g., O’Brien, 206 A.2d at 886; Prescott v. Plant Indus., Inc., 88 F.R.D. 257, 261 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“Although there is no rigid, generalized rule as to what constitutes ‘internal 
affairs’ for this purpose, courts have declined jurisdiction where a decision would affect 
corporate structure or policy, but have retained jurisdiction over cases involving breach of 
fiduciary duty, fraud, or contracts.”). 
 15  See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, Choice of Law Considerations—Internal Affairs and 
Statutory Outreach, in SHAREHOLDER DERIV. ACTIONS L. & PRAC. § 2:13 (2017–2018), 
Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2018) (“Once the jurisdictional impediment fell, the 
question became whether a court should keep jurisdiction of an internal affairs case or dismiss 
under the rubric of forum non conveniens.”). 
 16  See In re Dohring, 142 Misc. 2d at 433 (“[T]he fact that the relief nominally sought 
(i.e., dissolution and forfeiture of the corporate charter) is not technically within the power of 
the court does not bar the award of lesser or alternative relief in this action.”). 
 17  9 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 4223.50, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017); Heine v. 
Streamline Foods Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 383, 391 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (“The internal affairs 
doctrine is a long-standing choice of law principle which recognizes that only one state should 
have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—the state of incorporation.” 
(quoting VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Del. 
2005)). 
 18  Gregory Scott Crespi, Choice of Law in Veil-Piercing Litigation: Why Courts Should 
Discard the Internal Affairs Rule and Embrace General Choice-of-Law Principles, 64 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 90 (2008). 
 19  E.g., Vergopia v. Shaker, 922 A.2d 1238, 1239 (N.J. 2007) (applying section 145 of 
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action or amendment is valid under Delaware law.20  Or an Alabama court 
may have to determine whether stockholders may demand to inspect 
corporate records.21 
Each of the preceding examples were based on real cases and, in each 
of those cases, Delaware’s sister states were tasked with applying Delaware 
law, specifically Delaware’s General Corporation Law.22  But an emerging 
issue—once called the “blunderbuss”23 approach to legal advocacy—has 
found a home in several federal district courts and some state courts.24  Under 
that approach, Delaware’s General Corporation Law strips other courts of 
subject matter jurisdiction by reserving exclusive jurisdiction in the 
Delaware Chancery Court.25 
Four sections of Delaware’s General Corporation Law vest the State’s 
Chancery Court with “exclusive jurisdiction” to hear actions brought under 
those sections.26  They cover broad topics, including indemnification of 
officers and directors,27 business combinations with interested 
stockholders,28 the validity of defective corporate acts or stock and 
ratification thereof,29 and the inspection of corporate books and records.30  
Some of the sections have been around for decades, but the argument that 
 
the Delaware Code). 
 20  See Finnegan v. Baker, 35 N.E.3d 778, 787 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015). 
 21  Pearson v. Westervelt Co., 203 So. 3d 73, 83 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016). 
 22  See Vergopia, 922 A.2d at 1245 (applying Delaware’s General Corporation Law); 
Finnegan, 35 N.E.3d 778 at 787 (same); Pearson, 203 So. 3d at 79 (same). 
 23  Blunderbuss, COLLINS DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary 
/english/blunderbuss (last visited March 3, 2019) (meaning clumsy and unsubtle). 
 24  E.g., Reserve Sols. Inc. v. Vernaglia, 438 F. Supp. 2d 280, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Foti 
v. W. Sizzlin Corp., 64 Va. Cir. 64 (2004); Yale S. Corp. v. Eclipse Servs., Inc., No. 10-CV-
0337-CVE-FHM, 2010 WL 2854687, at *3 (N.D. Okla. July 19, 2010); Lynch v. Basinger, 
No. CIV. 12-637 RBK/KMW, 2012 WL 6213781, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2012). 
 25  Reserve Sols. Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 289 (finding the court does not have subject 
matter jurisdiction due to the statute’s exclusive reservation of jurisdiction in the Delaware 
Chancery Court); accord Transeo S.A.R.L. v. Bessemer Venture Partners VI L.P., 936 F. 
Supp. 2d 376, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Foti, 64 Va. Cir. at 65 (“This court has no jurisdiction to 
hear a claim under a Delaware statute when the Delaware legislature has conferred jurisdiction 
exclusively on its own courts and neither the Constitution of Virginia nor the General 
Assembly grants authority to supercede [sic] such restriction.”); Yale S. Corp., 2010 WL 
2854687, at *3; Lynch, 2012 WL 6213781, at *5; Carbone v. Nxegen Holdings, Inc., No. 
HHDCV136039761S, 2013 WL 5781103, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2013) (finding that 
the reservation of exclusive jurisdiction in Delaware’s General Corporation Law 
unambiguously tried to divest other state courts). 
 26  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 145(k), 203(e), 205(e), 220(c)–(d) (West 2018) (“The Court 
of Chancery is hereby vested with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all actions . . . 
brought under this section.”). 
 27  Id. § 145. 
 28  Id. § 203. 
 29  Id. § 205. 
 30  Id. § 220. 
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the statutes’ reservations of exclusive jurisdiction in the Delaware Chancery 
Court prevent other state courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction 
over an action has only recently found acceptance.31 
Two different courts within the Southern District of New York, along 
with a Virginia state trial court, have held the jurisdictional reservations in 
these statutes prevented their courts from exercising subject matter 
jurisdiction over actions brought under Delaware law.32  A Connecticut state 
trial court agreed with that interpretation.33  But the Seventh Circuit, New 
York State appellate courts, and a different Connecticut trial court have 
disagreed, albeit each for different reasons, holding Delaware’s General 
Corporation Law either does not or cannot strip subject matter jurisdiction 
from foreign courts.34  From here on, and for ease of reference, the former 
approach will be referred to as the “jurisdictional stripping approach” and 
the latter as the “internal approach.”  As will be discussed in depth in Part II, 
however, it should be noted that the differences between those courts’ 
holdings are more nuanced.35 
 
 
 31  In 1998, the Seventh Circuit vociferously rejected the argument that the exclusive 
jurisdiction provisions stripped it of subject matter jurisdiction.  Truck Components Inc. v. 
Beatrice Co., 143 F.3d 1057, 1061–62 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Nor do we suppose for one second 
that Delaware set out to contract the scope of federal jurisdiction. . . .  It is an example of the 
blunderbuss approach to appellate advocacy . . . .”).  But multiple post-2000 cases have 
accepted the argument.  See Reserve Sols. Inc. v. Vernaglia, 438 F. Supp. 2d 280, 289 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Transeo S.A.R.L. v. Bessemer Venture Partners VI L.P., 936 F. Supp. 2d 
376, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Foti v. W. Sizzlin Corp., 64 Va. Cir. 64 (2004). 
 32  Reserve Sols. Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 289; accord Transeo S.A.R.L., 936 F. Supp. 2d 
at 405; Foti, 64 Va. Cir. at 65. 
 33  Carbone v. Nxegen Holdings, Inc., No. HHDCV136039761S, 2013 WL 5781103, at 
*4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2013). 
 34  Truck Components Inc., 143 F.3d at 1062 (“Delaware maintains separate systems of 
courts in law and equity.  Claims based on corporate arrangements go to the Court of Chancery 
rather than to the law courts, where other contracts are litigated.  Such an intra-state allocation 
has no effect on federal litigation, which merged law and equity long ago.”); accord Sachs v. 
Adeli, 804 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (App. Div. 2005); Anderson v. Children’s Corner, Inc., No. 
CV106011812S, 2011 WL 925442, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2011); see also Finnegan 
v. Baker, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 35, 41–42 (2015) (applying sections 204 and 205 of the Delaware 
Code). 
 35  Compare Reserve Sols. Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 289 (holding the statute strips the 
federal court of subject matter jurisdiction), with Foti, 64 Va. Cir. at 64 (holding principles of 
comity demand Virginia honor the statute’s intent to reserve subject matter jurisdiction in 
Delaware Chancery Court), with Carbone, 2013 WL 5781103, at *4 (finding that the 
reservation of exclusive jurisdiction in Delaware’s General Corporation Law unambiguously 
tried to divest other state courts, but this is in conflict with Connecticut policy and, thus, 
cannot divest the State of subject matter jurisdiction), with Truck Components Inc., 143 F.3d 
at 1062 (finding the Delaware Legislature did not intend to try to strip subject matter 
jurisdiction and, even if it did, it had no such power), and Anderson, 2011 WL 925442, at *3, 
with Sachs v. Adeli, 804 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (App. Div. 2005) (holding relinquishing subject 
matter jurisdiction would violate New York’s public policy). 
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Whether the jurisdictional stripping approach ultimately prevails or 
proves simply to be a passing fad, there are huge implications not only in the 
field of corporate litigation, but for American choice-of-law jurisprudence 
as a whole—and, indeed, for federalism itself. 
First, as explored in depth in Part III, the jurisdiction stripping approach 
overreads the Delaware Legislature’s intent and fails to honor the true 
meaning and simplicity of the provision. The reservations of “exclusive 
jurisdiction” in the Chancery Court are simply intended to differentiate 
between Delaware’s other state courts.36  This is because Delaware maintains 
separate courts of law and equity.37  The jurisdictional provisions in the 
General Corporation Law are meant only to differentiate between internal 
state courts and were never intended to strip jurisdiction from other states.38 
Second, the jurisdiction stripping approach, as discussed in depth in 
Part IV, defies American principles of federalism and does not fit within the 
United States’ legal system.  Each state, as evinced by the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the Constitution, is presumed equally competent to 
adjudicate a case, even when a case calls on the state to apply the law of 
another.39  Further, although almost all states adhere to the internal affairs 
doctrine, it is not a rule of law, and it is ultimately the choice of law rules 
and policies adopted by the situs state that determines what substantive law 
applies.40  The Constitution simply does not grant state legislatures the power 
to reach into their sister states’ territory and enact laws that would strip that 
state’s courts of otherwise proper jurisdiction.41  Moreover, under the current 
regime, the situs state has ultimate authority as to whether it would honor the 
enacting state’s attempt to strip it of jurisdiction.42 
Part II will discuss the emerging split in authorities and will discuss the 
nuances of each court’s approach.  Part III will discuss the Delaware 
Legislature’s intent in using the term “exclusive jurisdiction.”  Part IV will 
explain why state legislatures do not have the power to strip jurisdiction from 
other courts—even when those states apply the laws of the drafting state.  
Part IV will also explain why a new subject matter jurisdiction exception for 
corporations is unnecessary, contrary to American principles of federalism, 
and potentially harmful to corporations. 
 
 36  See infra Part III; see also infra Parts II.A, F. 
 37  See infra Part III; see also infra Parts II.A, F. 
 38  See infra Part III; see also infra Parts II.A, F. 
 39  See infra Part IV; see also infra Part III, Parts II.A, F. 
 40  See infra Part IV; see also infra Parts II.A, C, F. 
 41  Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39, 42–43 (1965). 
 42  See, e.g., Sachs v. Adeli, 804 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (App. Div. 2005). 
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II. THE EMERGING SPLIT 
A. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (1998): No Power or Intent to 
Strip Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
In 1984, Beatrice Company spun off a subsidiary named Brillion and 
sold its stock to a small group of investors who, four years later, resold it to 
Truck Components Inc. (Truck Components).43  Brillion and Truck 
Components brought suit against Beatrice demanding it bear the costs of 
environmental cleanup at and near Brillion’s facilities in Wisconsin.44  
Brillion and Truck Components also sued Brillion’s former president who 
had arraigned for disposal of the company’s wastes.45 
The Seventh Circuit found Brillion was not the victim, but the polluter 
itself, and found the fact Brillion was spun off of its incorporators did not 
make them liable for its actions.46  As for the former president, he had agreed 
to continue serving as president of Brillion after it was spun off in exchange 
for Brillion indemnifying him for any actions he took while an officer of 
Brillion.47  The Seventh Circuit held Brillion’s admission that it sued its 
former president as a shareholder entitled the former president to victory on 
the merits because any award would be circular due to the indemnity 
agreement.48  The circuit court also held the former president was entitled to 
recovery of expenses under Brillion’s corporate articles and bylaws, which 
provided for indemnification to the maximum extent allowed by state law.49 
Brillion was a Delaware Corporation, so the Seventh Circuit applied 
Delaware’s General Corporation Law, specifically title 8, section 145 of the 
Delaware Code, which provides an officer or director sued unsuccessfully 
by the firm recovers defense expenses as a matter of course.50  The plaintiffs 
countered by alleging the Seventh Circuit lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
to award indemnification expenses under section 145, because subsection (k) 
provided: “[t]he Court of Chancery is hereby vested with exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear and determine all actions for advancement of expenses 
or indemnification brought under this section or any bylaw, agreement, vote 
of stockholders or disinterested directors, or otherwise.”51 
 
 
 43  Truck Components Inc. v. Beatrice Co., 143 F.3d 1057, 1058 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 44  Id. 
 45  Id. at 1061. 
 46  Id. at 1059. 
 47  Id. at 1061. 
 48  Id. 
 49  Truck Components Inc., 143 F.3d at 1061. 
 50  Id. (applying section 145(k) of the Delaware Code). 
 51  Id. (alteration in original). 
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First, the Seventh Circuit found section 145(k) did not apply on its own 
terms because Brillion brought the action under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, not under 
section 145.52  In essence, the indemnification action was brought as a 
counterclaim and therefore subsection (k) did not apply.53 
Next, reaching the deeper issue, the court held state law could not 
prevent a federal court from exercising jurisdiction created by Congress.54  
The court, in part, relied on General Atomic Co. v. Felter, in which the 
Supreme Court held a New Mexico state court lacked the power to enjoin 
litigants from filing and prosecuting a claim in federal court because 
Congress grants the right to bring an action in federal court and the states 
have no power to limit such right.55  Because New Mexico lacked the power 
to restrict federal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s 
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.56 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit relied on a prior Seventh Circuit decision 
for the general proposition that states have no power to enlarge or contract 
federal jurisdiction.57 
While the states have never tried to expand federal subject matter 
jurisdiction, courts and commentators have long assumed that they have no 
power to contract federal jurisdiction either.58  That assumption still holds 
true and was affirmed by the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Marshall v. 
Marshall—binding precedent on the federal courts.59 
 
 52  Id. (applying section 145(k) of the Delaware Code). 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Gen. Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 12, 16 (1977). 
 56  Id. at 13. 
 57  Truck Components Inc., 143 F.3d at 1061 (citing Beach v. Owens–Corning Fiberglas 
Corp., 728 F.2d 407, 409 (7th Cir. 1984)). Beach v. Owens cites to a Ninth Circuit case which, 
in turn, collects various Supreme Court cases supporting the proposition.  See Beach, 728 F.2d 
at 409 (citing Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 682 F.2d 1311, 1315–16 (9th Cir.1982) (collecting 
cases)). 
 58  17A FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 4211 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Apr. 
2018); Davet v. City of Cleveland, 456 F.3d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 2006); Thompkins v. Stuttgart 
Sch. Dist. No. 22, 787 F.2d 439, 441–42 (8th Cir.1986) (holding state legislation may not 
preclude a federal court from exercising pendent jurisdiction even if it vests exclusive 
jurisdiction in its state courts); Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 713 (4th 
Cir. 1961). 
 59  Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 313–14 (2006) (“It is clear, under [Erie] that 
Texas law governs the substantive elements of Vickie’s tortious interference claim.  It is also 
clear, however, that Texas may not reserve to its probate courts the exclusive right to 
adjudicate a transitory tort.  We have long recognized that ‘a State cannot create a transitory 
cause of action and at the same time destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of action 
in any court having jurisdiction.’ Jurisdiction is determined ‘by the law of the court’s creation 
and cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial operation of a [state] statute . . . , even though it 
created the right of action.’  Directly on point, we have held that the jurisdiction of the federal 
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Additionally, the Seventh Circuit stated that it would not “suppose for 
one second” that the Delaware Legislature sought to contract federal 
jurisdiction when it enacted section 145(k).60  Instead, the court believed the 
exclusive jurisdiction provision in section 145 was merely intended to 
differentiate between Delaware’s state courts.61  As the Seventh Circuit 
explained, unlike the federal judiciary, which merged courts of law and 
equity long ago, Delaware maintains separate courts of law and equity, with 
the court of equity being the Chancery Court.62  The Seventh Circuit thought 
it obvious that the recital of “exclusive” jurisdiction was simply the 
Delaware Legislature’s allocation of jurisdiction between its own courts, 
going so far as to call the Plaintiff’s argument “an example of the 
blunderbuss approach to appellate advocacy.”63  Yet, that approach has since 
found a home in certain state and federal courts, including the Southern 
District of New York. 
B. Virginia Trial Court (2004): Jurisdiction Flows from the 
Governing Statute and Comity Demands Adherence, Especially in 
the Case of Corporations 
In Foti v. W. Sizzlin Corp., Foti made a written request, as permitted by 
section 220 of Delaware’s General Corporation Law, that he, as a Western 
Sizzlin shareholder, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 
business in Roanoke, Virginia, be permitted to inspect the corporate books 
and records.64  Western Sizzlin denied his request and Foti filed a Bill of 
Complaint asking that a Writ of Mandamus be issued in accord with section 
220, to compel Western Sizzlin to permit Foti to inspect the corporation’s 
books and records.65  Western Sizzlin demurred, asserting that Virginian 
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to mandate inspection under section 
220 because subsection (d) reserves exclusive jurisdiction in the Delaware 
Chancery Court.66  The Virginia trial court sustained Western Sizzlin’s 
demur.67 
In a thoughtful opinion, the trial court discussed how Virginian courts 
may only be conferred subject matter jurisdiction by the State’s Constitution 
 
courts, ‘having existed from the beginning of the Federal government, [can]not be impaired 
by subsequent state legislation creating courts of probate.”) (internal citations omitted).   
 60  Truck Components Inc., 143 F.3d at 1061–62. 
 61  Id. at 1062. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Foti v. W. Sizzlin Corp., 64 Va. Cir. 64, 64 (2004). 
 65  Id. 
 66  Id.  
 67  Id. 
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or General Assembly.68  The court said “[w]here subject matter jurisdiction 
is acquired from the General Assembly, the General Assembly may . . . 
choose to withhold, limit, or carve out exceptions” to the courts’ jurisdiction, 
and comity suggests that the limitations imposed by one state’s legislature 
must be universally acknowledged.69 
Further, the court discussed how corporations are special when it comes 
to applying the laws of other states.70  Citing the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Broderick v. Rosner, the court described how becoming a shareholder “is 
something more than a contract, it is entering into a complex and abiding 
relation, and as marriage looks to domicile, membership looks to and must 
be governed by the law of the State granting the incorporation.”71 
From this opinion, the court appears to have made two alternative 
holdings: (1) Because the applicable statute restricted subject matter 
jurisdiction to the Delaware Chancery Court, Virginian courts lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction; and, alternatively, (2) comity demands, especially in the 
context of shareholder disputes, that foreign states respect the state of 
incorporation’s limitations on jurisdiction.  As discussed in Part IV, the first 
holding appears to be an error.  And, as discussed in Part III, the second 
holding misconstrues Delaware law.  A traditional forum non conveniens 
analysis would have been more appropriate here and could have resulted in 
the same outcome. 
C. New York Appellate Courts (2005): Comity Is Not a Rule of Law 
and New York Public Policy Prevails 
The New York state courts sided with the Seventh Circuit, but on 
different grounds.72  In Sachs v. Adeli, the plaintiff, Richard Sachs, brought 
a fraud action against Adeli and Klothes (NY) LLC, a limited liability 
company incorporated under Delaware law.73  Sachs moved to compel Adeli 
and Klothes (NY) “to authorize the release of tax returns filed by their 
predecessor in interest.”74  The defendants argued New York state courts 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide this case because the Delaware 
Commerce and Trade Law “vest[ed] exclusive jurisdiction over this dispute 
in the Delaware Court of Chancery.”75 
 
 68  Id. at 65. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Foti, 64 Va. Cir. at 65–66. 
 71  Id. at 67. 
 72  Sachs v. Adeli, 804 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (App. Div. 2005). 
 73  Id. at 732. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. at 733 (citing DEL. CODE ANN, tit. 6, § 18-305 (f) (West, Westlaw through 81 Del. 
Laws 2018, chs. 200–220)).  
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The New York appellate court rejected the defendants’ assertion that 
Delaware law could strip them of subject matter jurisdiction.76  Quoting the 
New York Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, the court 
held the doctrine of comity “is not a rule of law, but one of practice, 
convenience and expediency.”77  The court explained that, so long as the 
New York courts have an interest in the litigation, the purported “exclusive” 
jurisdiction of the applicable state statute does not prevent the State’s courts 
from exercising subject matter jurisdiction.78 
Moreover, the court also cited New York’s strong policy “interest in 
maintaining and fostering its undisputed status as the preeminent commercial 
and financial nerve center of the Nation and the world.”79  The court held 
that “that interest naturally embraces a very strong policy of assuring ready 
access to a forum for redress of injuries arising out of transactions” occurring 
within the State.80  Accordingly, because the complained-of transaction took 
place in New York, the court held New York’s strong public policy must 
prevail over the conflicting foreign legislation.81 
The ruling in Adeli has its roots in Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. United 
Missouri Bank, another appellate case from New York’s First Department.82  
In that case, the appellate court held a Kansas statute that reserved exclusive 
jurisdiction over the probate of Kansan estates did not divest the New York 
courts of subject matter jurisdiction.83  Citing the same decision from the 
New York Court of Appeals as Sachs, the court relied on the fact that comity 
did not require, or even suggest, that the State’s courts surrender their interest 
in adjudicating disputes, which have significant contacts with New York 
commerce.84 
The New York state courts’ approach to this issue relies on the fact that 
the doctrine of comity is not a rule of law and does not compel the State to 
apply Delaware law.85  Rather, the doctrine of comity is simply one state’s 
entirely voluntary decision to defer to the law of another to promote 
uniformity, encourage cooperative federalism, or express the hope for 
 
 76  Id. 
 77  Sachs, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 733 (quoting Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. Univ. of Houston, 49 
N.Y.2d 574, 580 (1980)). 
 78  Id. (quoting Ehrlich-Bober & Co., 49 N.Y.2d at 582). 
 79  Id. (quoting Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. United Missouri Bank, 643 N.Y.S.2d 528, 
531 (App. Div. 1996)). 
 80  Id. (quoting Marine Midland Bank, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 531)). 
 81  Id. 
 82  643 N.Y.S.2d 528. 
 83  Id. at 531. 
 84  Id. 
 85  Ehrlich-Bober & Co., 404 N.E.2d at 730 (quoting Mast, Foos & Co. v Stover Mfg. 
Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900)). 
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reciprocal advantage in a future case.86  When there is conflict, New York’s 
policy prevails over the foreign legislation.87 
Importantly, the New York courts seemed to assume the reservation of 
exclusive jurisdiction was intended to strip subject matter jurisdiction and 
that application of Delaware law would require the court honor that 
reservation.88  Consequently, the court applied New York law and opined 
that, even if Delaware law was to apply, the result would be the same.89 
The New York appellate court’s decision to apply New York law is 
legally sound.90  But the assumptions the court appears to make about 
Delaware law pigeonholes lower courts and may create future issues.  For 
example, if a New York Supreme Court (i.e., trial court) wished to apply 
Delaware law because a company is incorporated in Delaware and New York 
law would have a different result, it could not do so if the applicable 
Delaware statute contains an exclusive jurisdiction provision.91  That is 
because a false dichotomy appears to have been created: either the court 
applies Delaware law (including the letter of the exclusive jurisdiction 
provision) or it applies New York law.92  The trial court has no option of 
applying just the substantive provisions of Delaware law.  As explained in 
Parts III and IV, a proper interpretation of Delaware law or a conventional 
application of federal principles would give the trial courts this option. 
D. Southern District of New York (2006): Without Explanation, State 
Legislatures May Strip Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Unlike the New York state courts, the Southern District of New York 
gave effect to the exclusive jurisdiction provisions in Delaware’s General 
Corporation Law in two cases.93  In Reserve Solutions Inc. v. Vernaglia, the 
plaintiff, Reserve Solutions, Inc., brought a breach of fiduciary duty action 
against Vernaglia, a former officer and director and a current shareholder of 
the company.94  Vernaglia counterclaimed for, among other things, 
inspection of the corporate books and records.95  Reserve Solutions was 
 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. 
 88  See Sachs, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 735. 
 89  Id. at 734–35. 
 90  See Ehrlich-Bober & Co., 404 N.E.2d at 730. 
 91  See Sachs, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 733. 
 92  See id. 
 93  Transeo S.A.R.L. v. Bessemer Venture Partners VI L.P., 936 F. Supp. 2d 376, 405 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (declining subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Delaware’s exclusive 
jurisdiction provision); Reserve Sols. Inc. v. Vernaglia, 438 F. Supp. 2d 280, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (same). 
 94  Reserve Sols. Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 284. 
 95  Id. 
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incorporated under Delaware law, but had offices located in Manhattan, New 
York.96 
Reserve Solutions argued section 220 of Delaware’s General 
Corporation Law unmistakably vested the Delaware Chancery Court with 
exclusive jurisdiction over claims to compel the inspection of books and 
records under the applicable statute.97  Pursuant to the statutory mandate, 
Reserve Solutions asked the Southern District of New York to dismiss 
Vernaglia’s counterclaim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.98 
Vernaglia, in response, contended that the statutory provision reserving 
exclusive jurisdiction in the Delaware Chancery Court was either procedural 
or remedial.99  Statutory provisions that are procedural or remedial, 
Vernaglia argued, have no bearing on substantive rights and, therefore, the 
Southern District of New York has subject matter jurisdiction despite the 
statutory reservation.100  Vernaglia’s argument rested entirely on a district 
court case from the Western District of Pennsylvania, NVF Co. v. Sharon 
Steel Corp.101  In that case, the district court, in considering an identical 
recital of exclusive jurisdiction, held the provision was either procedural or 
remedial, and the district court could exercise subject matter jurisdiction.102 
The Southern District of New York sided with Reserve Solutions.103  
The court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the exclusive 
reservation of jurisdiction in Section 220.104  The implications of this ruling 
are striking when taken to its logical ends.  In a few sentences, the Southern 
District of New York surrendered its ability to hear petitions for the 
inspection of corporate books and records arising under Delaware law.105  
 
 96  Id. 
 97  Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Plaintiff and Third-Party 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint and in 
Opposition to Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Leave to File and Serve 
Second Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint 
at 10, Reserve Sols. Inc. v. Vernaglia, 438 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 05-8622), 
2006 WL 738793. 
 98  Id. at 2. 
 99  Memorandum of Law of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff i) in Opposition to Motion 
of Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant to Dismiss the Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint, and ii) in Support of Motion of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff for Leave to File 
and Serve Second Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint at 10, Reserve Sols. Inc. v. Vernaglia, 438 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 
05-CV-8622), 2006 WL 738792. 
 100  Id. at 10–11. 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id.; NVF Co. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1091, 1093 (W.D. Pa. 1969). 
 103  Reserve Sols. Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 288–89. 
 104  Id. 
 105  See id.; see also Transeo S.A.R.L. v. Bessemer Venture Partners VI L.P., 936 F. Supp. 
2d 376, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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And this ruling may not be limited to actions for inspection because, as 
discussed above, various other sections of Delaware’s General Corporation 
Law contain these recitals of exclusive jurisdiction.106 
Though this ruling is not binding in subsequent cases within the 
Southern District of New York, in 2013, the Southern District followed its 
holding in Reserve Solutions.107  This trend, if it continues, amounts to an 
astonishing abdication by the federal court seated in the heart of the nation’s 
largest financial center.108  But more problematic is that, if other federal 
courts follow this approach and respect reservations of exclusive 
jurisdiction, then the federal courts would, in effect, allow state legislatures 
to contract federal jurisdiction in cases where the federal court applies the 
state’s laws.109  As explained in Part IV.A, states do not have such power. 
E. Proliferation of the Southern District of New York’s Approach 
The approach to these recitals of exclusive jurisdiction taken by the 
Southern District of New York in Reserve Solutions and Transeo, appears to 
be proliferating.110  In Yale South Corp., an unpublished opinion from 2010, 
the Northern District of Oklahoma declined to assert subject matter 
jurisdiction over a petition for inspection of a corporation’s books and 
records, because of section 220’s recital of exclusive jurisdiction.111  The 
court relied on Reserve Solutions and Foti.112 
Then, citing both Reserve Solutions and Yale, in another unpublished 
opinion, the District of New Jersey also dismissed an action brought under 
section 220 of Delaware’s General Corporation Law.113  The court held it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action because of the statute’s 
 
 106  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 145(k), 203(e), 205(e), 220(c)–(d) (West, Westlaw through 
81 Del. Laws 2018, chs. 200–220) (“The Court of Chancery is hereby vested with exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear and determine all actions . . . brought under this section.”). 
 107  Transeo S.A.R.L., 936 F. Supp. 2d at 405. 
 108  See The Leonard Lopate Show, America’s Influential Trial Court and the Evolution of 
the Justice System, WNYC (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.wnyc.org/story/americas-most-
influential-trial-court-and-evolution-justice-system/; Ben Moshinsky, The 20 Most Powerful 
Financial Centres in the World, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 12, 2017, 4:32 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/most-powerful-financial-centres-gfci-index-for-2017-2017-
9/#20-shenzhen-the-chinese-city-climbed-two-places-to-reach-the-top-20-scoring-highly-in-
the-infrastructure-category-1. 
 109  See Yale S. Corp. v. Eclipse Servs., Inc., No. 10-CV-0337-CVE-FHM, 2010 WL 
2854687, at *3 (N.D. Okla. July 19, 2010) (declining jurisdiction because statute contained 
an exclusive jurisdiction provision); Lynch v. Basinger, No. CIV. 12-637 RBK/KMW, 2012 
WL 6213781, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2012) (same). 
 110  See Yale S. Corp., 2010 WL 2854687, at *3; Lynch, 2012 WL 6213781, at *5. 
 111  Yale S. Corp., 2010 WL 2854687, at *3. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Lynch, 2012 WL 6213781, at *5. 
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exclusive reservation of jurisdiction in the Delaware Chancery Court.114 
F. Connecticut’s Twin Approaches: No Power or Intent to Strip 
Jurisdiction vs. Connecticut Public Policy Prevails 
Two thoughtful opinions issued by trial courts in the State of 
Connecticut explicitly address the emerging controversy over Delaware 
General Corporations Law’s exclusive jurisdiction reservations.115  The first 
is Anderson v. Children’s Corner, Inc.  Children’s Corner was a Delaware 
corporation that had its principal place of business in Ridgefield, 
Connecticut.116  Three stockholders filed a one-count complaint asserting 
their rights to inspect the corporate books and records under section 220 of 
Delaware’s General Corporations Law.117  The defendant-corporation filed 
a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that 
section 220 vested exclusive jurisdiction to decide controversies under the 
statute in the Delaware Court of Chancery.118 
The question was one of first impression for the Connecticut courts.119  
Citing Fotiand Sachs, the court recognized the split in authorities and, 
instead, turned to statutory history of section 220 to determine the Delaware 
Legislature’s intent.120 
The court found that, before section 220 was enacted in 1967, the 
inspection of corporate books and records was not grounds for independent 
and primary relief.121  This meant that, while the inspection of corporate 
books and records could be a remedy incidental to another cause of action, 
it was not sufficient to establish standing in the Delaware courts.122  In other 
words, the inspection of corporate books and records was initially a remedy, 
but not a cause of action.123 
 
 114  Id. 
 115  Anderson v. Children’s Corner, Inc., No. CV106011812S, 2011 WL 925442, at *2 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2011) (“There is a split in authority in other jurisdictions as to 
whether the Delaware statute divests sister states of jurisdiction to hear an action under § 
220.”); Carbone v. Nxegen Holdings, Inc., No. HHDCV136039761S, 2013 WL 5781103, at 
*5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2013) (“Several other courts that have addressed the meaning of 
the exclusive jurisdiction provision in § 220 have come to the same conclusion . . . .  In 
contrast to those decisions, the court in [Anderson], determined that § 220(c) did not deprive 
other states of jurisdiction over claims under that statute.”). 
 116  Anderson, 2011 WL 925442, at *1. 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. at *2. 
 120  Id. 
 121  Id. (citing Perrott v. U.S. Banking Corp., 53 F. Supp. 953, 957 (D. Del. 1944); State 
v. Standard Oil Co. of Kansas, 18 A.2d 235, 237–38 (Del. Super. Ct. 1941); Parrish v. 
Commonwealth Tr. Co., 181 A. 658, 659 (Del. Ch. 1935)). 
 122  Perrott, 53 F. Supp. at 957. 
 123  Id.; Letter from Collins J. Seitz, Chancellor, Del. Chancery Court, to Irving Morris 2 
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Because the inspection remedy was only incidental and not a cause of 
action, either the Delaware Superior Court or Chancery Court could order 
such a remedy, if deemed appropriate, in any case brought before them on 
other grounds.124  The court in Anderson found the Delaware Corporation 
Law Revision Committee explicitly named the Court of Chancery to allow 
new, standalone actions for inspection to be resolved expeditiously by one 
trial-level court.125 
In light of section 220’s statutory history, the court declined to find the 
Delaware Legislature intended to try to divest her sister states’ courts of 
subject matter jurisdiction.126  Instead, and like the Seventh Circuit, the court 
held Connecticut courts did have subject matter jurisdiction because the 
explicit reservation of “exclusive jurisdiction” was intended only to 
differentiate between Delaware’s internal courts.127 
Nonetheless, the court went on to differentiate Foti on other grounds.128  
The court appears to have assumed from the Foti opinion that Virginia law 
does not have some provision that grants its courts general jurisdiction on 
matters arising within the state.129  Instead, it appears the court in Anderson 
believed that subject matter jurisdiction in Virginia must be specifically 
granted in each statute or in specific matters identified by the Virginia 
Constitution.130  The court goes on to cite several Connecticut statutes that 
 
(Apr. 22, 1965), http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.pdf 
(“Although he does not say so, he seems to assume that an equitable owner could obtain 
inspection in Chancery.  I am not sure that this is the law.  I believe that inspection in Chancery 
either has to be incidental to a pending case in Chancery or in the law court.  Thus, although 
I could be wrong, I believe the granting of a right to inspect to an equitable owner, apart from 
pending litigation, would amount to the granting of a new right.”); Letter from Irving Morris 
to All Members of the Del. Corp. Law Revision Comm’n, Stock Holder’s Rights of Inspection 
1 (May 6, 1965),  
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.pdf  (“As we know, 
granting an equitable owner of stock or a voting trust certificate holder (legal or equitable) a 
right of inspection would introduce a new right in our law.”). 
 124  Anderson, 2011 WL 925442, at *2; Letter from Collins J. Seitz, Chancellor, Del. 
Chancery Court, to Irving Morris 2 (Apr. 22, 1965), 
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.pdf; Letter from Irving 
Morris to All Members of the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Commission, Stock 
Holder’s Rights of Inspection 1 (May 6, 1965), 
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.pdf. 
 125  Anderson, 2011 WL 925442, at *2; see also Letter from Ernest Folk III to Richard F. 
Corroon (Dec. 20, 1966), http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocumen 
ts.pdf (“I am glad that Delaware will retain the established method of keeping corporate 
litigation in the Court of Chancery.”). 
 126  Anderson, 2011 WL 925442, at *3. 
 127  Id. 
 128  Id. 
 129  Id. 
 130  Id. 
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vest the Connecticut Superior Court with original jurisdiction for all causes 
of action arising within the states, except probate actions and those where 
jurisdiction is explicitly provided by statute.131 
This is an interesting point on its face, but one without substance.  
Virginia civil courts do have general jurisdiction over civil claims, which 
presumes original jurisdiction just like that of the Connecticut Superior 
Court.132  Moreover, if the court’s understanding in Anderson was correct, 
then Virginia could never exercise subject matter jurisdiction over cases in 
which its courts would apply foreign law because the Virginian court would 
have no statutory or constitutional provision granting it jurisdiction.  This is, 
obviously, not the case, as Virginian courts have applied foreign law, 
including Delaware’s General Corporation Law.133 
In Carbone v. Nxegen Holdings, Inc., the Superior Court of Connecticut 
for the District of Hartford disagreed with the District of New Haven’s 
approach in Anderson, primarily that the Anderson court examined the 
statutory history of the Delaware law where the statute, in the Carbone 
court’s opinion, was “unambiguous” on its face.134  The court in Carbone 
found no Delaware case interpreting the exclusive jurisdiction provision and, 
accordingly, applied Delaware’s rules of statutory construction.135  Pursuant 
to Delaware’s rules of statutory construction, the Connecticut court was 
tasked with determining whether the relevant statute was ambiguous, 
meaning it could be reasonably interpreted in two or more different ways or 
a literal reading would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result.136  If the 
statute is determined unambiguous, the Carbone court stated it must give the 
statutory language its plain meaning.137  Moreover, the Carbone court 
explained that, in accord with Delaware’s rules of construction, it must 
presume that the General Assembly purposefully chose particular language 
and that the court ought to avoid rendering any of the statute’s terms 
 
 131  Id. 
 132  See Virginia Courts in Brief, VIRGINIA’S JUSTICE SYSTEM (2009), 
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/cib.pdf (“The circuit court also handles any case for 
which jurisdiction is not specified in the Code of Virginia.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-513 
(West, Westlaw through End of the 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“[The circuit courts] shall have original 
and general jurisdiction of all civil cases, except . . . .”); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-77 (West, 
Westlaw through End of the 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 133  E.g., Stockbridge v. Gemini Air Cargo, Inc., 269 Va. 609, 609 (2005) (“[B]ecause the 
controversy involves the internal affairs of the corporation, the laws of Delaware, the state of 
incorporation, apply.”). 
 134  Carbone v. Nxegen Holdings, Inc., No. HHDCV136039761S, 2013 WL 5781103, at 
*5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2013) (“The court in Anderson did not, however, perform a proper 
statutory analysis.”). 
 135  Id. at *4. 
 136  Id. 
 137  Id.  
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superfluous.138 
Despite recognizing the split in authorities over the interpretation of 
section 220’s exclusive jurisdiction provision, the Carbone court found the 
statute unambiguous.139  Specifically, the Carbone court looked to the plain 
meaning of the term “exclusive” and two other parts of section 220, which 
state: “The demand under oath shall be directed to the corporation at its 
registered office in this State or at its principal place of business,” and “[t]he 
Court may order books, documents and records . . . to be brought within this 
State and kept in this State upon such terms and conditions as the order may 
prescribe.”140  The Carbone court believed it was clear that the Delaware 
Legislature, as evinced by its choice in terms and by the provisions quoted 
above, intended to permit only “the Delaware Chancery Court to adjudicate 
the inspection rights of shareholders of a Delaware corporation.”141  
Accordingly, the Carbone court found the Delaware law was in conflict with 
Connecticut law and moved on to a conflict-of-laws analysis142 
The Carbone court began by describing how Connecticut generally 
follows the internal affairs doctrine when it comes to corporate matters but 
may apply its own law where Connecticut has a dominant interest contrary 
to the applicable foreign law.143  The court then stated that several factors 
weighed in favor of applying Connecticut law, namely, that Nxegen 
Holdings’ principal place of business was in Connecticut and the company 
only did business in the State of Connecticut—not in Delaware.144  Because 
of these two facts, and in light of the state’s interest in providing a convenient 
forum for those doing business in the state, the Carbone court concluded 
Connecticut had a dominant interest in the litigation and held it should apply 
Connecticut inspection laws—and not the laws of Delaware (i.e., section 
220), the state in which the corporation was incorporated.145 
 
 
 138  Id.  
 139  Id. at *4–5. 
 140  Carbone, 2013 WL 5781103, at *4 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (b)–(c) (West 
2010)). 
 141  Id. 
 142  Id. at *5 (“Accordingly, the exclusive jurisdiction provision in § 220 creates an 
outcome determinative conflict of law between Delaware and Connecticut shareholder 
inspection rights provisions.  The court must therefore perform a conflict of law analysis to 
determine whether Delaware or Connecticut law should be applied.”). 
 143  Id. at *7. 
 144  Id. 
 145  Id. at *7–8 (“Connecticut’s interest in providing a shareholder an efficient adjudication 
of its inspection rights, in conjunction with the other factors discussed above, outweighs 
whatever Delaware’s interest may be in having shareholder inspection disputes adjudicated 
solely in its Chancery Court.  Accordingly, Connecticut law should be applied in the present 
matter.”). 
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The Carbone court’s ruling is an important illustration of how, even if 
the jurisdictional stripping approach prevails—which may seem like a boon 
for corporations because it would force prospective litigants to travel to 
Delaware to sue the company—such approach could backfire and be even 
less favorable to corporations than the internal approach.  This is because 
Delaware law is largely more favorable to corporations,146 and, if the 
jurisdictional stripping approach prevails, rather than the situs state 
abdicating subject matter jurisdiction, it may simply choose to apply its law 
out of public policy concerns.147  Under the Carbone court’s approach—and, 
indeed, the New York court’s approach—rather than these exclusive 
jurisdiction provisions promoting consistency in the adjudication of a 
corporation’s internal affairs, these provisions may undermine the internal 
affairs doctrine by forcing states to choose between surrendering subject 
matter jurisdiction or applying the situs state’s laws. 
The following section addresses the Delaware Legislature’s intent in 
utilizing recitals of “exclusive” jurisdiction.  While this may not be availing 
to jurisdictions that fail to find ambiguity in the recital, it is important 
nonetheless because it vindicates the Seventh Circuit’s and the Anderson 
court’s approach. 
G. Alaska Supreme Court (2018): States Cannot Strip Other States 
of Jurisdiction 
In Toni 1 Trust, by Tangwall v. Wacker, a Montana state court found 
the defendant fraudulently transferred property to a trust established under 
Alaska law and the transfers were void as a result.148  The defendant filed an 
action in Alaska, claiming the Alaska statute governing fraudulent transfers 
of property vested exclusive jurisdiction in Alaskan courts.149 
The statute at issue stated: “A court of this state has exclusive 
jurisdiction over an action brought under a cause of action or claim for relief 
that is based on a transfer of property to a trust that is the subject of this 
section.”150  Taking up the issue, the Alaska Supreme Court said “we have 
no doubt the Alaska legislature’s purpose in enacting that statute was to 
prevent other state and federal courts from exercising subject matter 
jurisdiction over fraudulent transfer actions against such trusts.  The 
question, however, is whether “[it] can achieve that intended result.”151  The 
 
 146  Haskins, supra note 1. 
 147  E.g., Sachs v. Adeli, 804 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (App. Div. 2005). 
 148  413 P.3d 1199, 1201 (Alaska 2018). 
 149  Id. 
 150  ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(k) (2018). 
 151  Toni 1 Tr., by Tangwall, 413 P.3d at 1203 (citations omitted). 
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Court held it could not.152 
Discussing Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George,153 the Alaska 
Supreme Court noted the United States Supreme Court long ago held states 
were not required to acquiesce to attempts by their sister states to limit their 
jurisdiction.154  “[A]cknowledg[ing] that several of [its] sister states have 
concluded that similar statutes do, in fact, restrict their jurisdiction,” the 
Court found those cases distinguishable because they were based on 
differences in state law or policy that was not applicable to Alaska.155  The 
Court found that under Tennessee Coal the assertion of exclusive jurisdiction 
could not render the judgment against the Alaskan trust unenforceable.156 
III. THE DELAWARE LEGISLATURE’S TRUE INTENT 
From the hodgepodge of opinions above,157 three approaches can be 
distilled with respect to the intent of the recitals.  Courts like the Seventh 
Circuit and the Anderson court looked to the legislative history and structure 
of the Delaware state courts to try and understand what the Delaware 
Legislature intended.158  The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme 
Court did not consider the Delaware Legislature’s intent and defaulted to its 
own policy interests to apply New York law.159  Similarly, the Western 
District of Pennsylvania also did not look to intent, but relied on general 
choice of laws conventions.160  The Carbone court was the only court to 
explicitly reject considering the legislative intent,161 but joined Virginia, the 
Southern District of New York, the District of New Jersey, and the Northern 
District of Oklahoma in, presumably, finding the statute unambiguous.162  In 
 
 152  Id. 
 153  233 U.S. 354 (1914). 
 154  Toni 1 Tr., by Tangwall, 413 P.3d at 1203 (citing Tennessee Coal, 233 U.S. at 360). 
 155  Id. at 1204. 
 156  Id. at 1205–06. 
 157  Truck Components, Inc. v. Beatrice Co., 143 F.3d 1057, 1061–62 (7th Cir. 1998); 
Transeo S.A.R.L. v. Bessemer Venture Partners VI L.P., 936 F. Supp. 2d 376, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013); Lynch v. Basinger, No. 12-637, 2012 WL 6213781, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2012); Yale 
S. Corp. v. Eclipse Servs., Inc., No. 10-CV-0337-CVE-FHM, 2010 WL 2854687, at *3 (N.D. 
Okla. July 19, 2010); Reserve Sols. Inc. v. Vernaglia, 438 F. Supp. 2d 280, 288–89 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006); NVF Co. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1091, 1093 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Toni 1 Tr., 
by Tangwall, 413 P.3d at 1203; Carbone v. Nxegen Holdings, Inc., No. HHDCV136039761S, 
2013 WL 5781103, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2013); Anderson v. Children’s Corner, 
Inc., No. CV106011812S, 2011 WL 925442, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2011); Sachs v. 
Adeli, 804 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Foti v. W. Sizzlin Corp., 64 Va. Cir. 
64, 65 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2004). 
 158  See Truck Components Inc, 143 F.3d at 1061–62; Anderson, 2011 WL 925442, at *3. 
 159  Sachs, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 733. 
 160  See NVF Co., 294 F. Supp. at 1093. 
 161  See Carbone, 2013 WL 5781103, at *5. 
 162  See id.; Transeo S.A.R.L., 936 F. Supp. 2d at 405; Lynch, 2012 WL 6213781, at *5; 
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sum, most courts have considered the Delaware Legislature’s intent, and a 
majority read the statute as unambiguously trying to strip jurisdiction from 
all other courts.163  The minority disagreed or completely avoided the 
issue.164 
In 2014, the Delaware Chancery Court finally spoke on the issue in Ex 
rel. Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust.165  In that case, William Nicholas Kloiber 
(“Nick”), the former special trustee of the Kloiber Dynasty Trust, allegedly 
took “action contrary to the status quo orders” issued by a Kentucky Family 
Court.166  The current special trustee, PNC Bank, and Nick “filed petitions 
seeking instructions and declarations” from the Delaware Chancery Court.167  
The two parties contended that the Kentucky Family Court improperly 
asserted jurisdiction over the trustee, the special trustee, and the trust because 
the Delaware Chancery Court had primary jurisdiction over the trust.168  
They implored the Chancery Court to “intervene to curb the perceived 
excesses of the Kentucky Family Court.”169  In particular, Nick sought a 
temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent Daniel Kloiber’s estranged, 
soon-to-be ex-wife from seeking enforcement of the status quo orders.170 
The trust at issue was an irrevocable trust agreement, executed in 
Delaware, by PNC Bank, Delaware.171  Moreover, the trust agreement 
selected Delaware as the original situs for the trust and called for Delaware 
law to govern the validity, construction, and effect of the trust agreement’s 
provisions.172 
In its petitions, PNC Bank argued the Delaware Chancery Court had 
exclusive jurisdiction over the trust pursuant to sections 3572(a) of 
 
Yale S. Corp., 2010 WL 2854687, at *3; Reserve Sols. Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 288–89; Foti, 
64 Va. Cir. at 65. 
 163  See, e.g., Truck Components Inc., 143 F.3d at 1061–62 (considering the Delaware 
Legislature’s intent); NVF Co., 294 F. Supp. at 1093 (not addressing intent); Sachs, 804 
N.Y.S.2d at 733 (not addressing intent); Anderson, 2011 WL 925442, at *3 (considering the 
Delaware Legislature’s intent); see also Transeo S.A.R.L., 936 F. Supp. 2d at 405 (reading the 
exclusive jurisdiction provision as unambiguous); Lynch, 2012 WL 6213781, at *5 (same); 
Yale S. Corp., 2010 WL 2854687, at *3 (same); Reserve Sols. Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 288–
89 (same); Foti, 64 Va. Cir. at 64–65 (same); Carbone, 2013 WL 5781103, at *5 (same). 
 164  See, e.g., Truck Components Inc., 143 F.3d at 1061–62 (no intent to strip); NVF Co., 
294 F. Supp. at 1093 (not addressing intent); Sachs, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 733 (not addressing 
intent); Anderson, 2011 WL 925442, at *3 (no intent to strip). 
 165  98 A.3d 924 (Del. Ch. 2014), appeal denied, 100 A.3d 1020 (Del. 2014). 
 166  Id. at 927 n.1, 928. 
 167  Id. at 928. 
 168  Id. 
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. 
 171  Ex rel. Daniel, 98 A.3d at 928. 
 172  Id. 
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Delaware’s Qualified Dispositions Act.173  Section 3572(a) contains a 
familiar recital: “The Court of Chancery shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
over any action brought with respect to a qualified disposition.”174 
Without hesitation, the court dispelled any uncertainty about the 
meaning of the recitals of exclusive jurisdiction in Delaware statutes.175  
Echoing the Seventh Circuit and the Anderson court, albeit in greater detail, 
the Delaware Chancery Court affirmed that the “exclusive” jurisdiction 
provisions, which are common throughout Delaware law, are used to 
differentiate between the state’s various internal courts of general and limited 
jurisdiction.176  The Chancery Court explained that, in addition to its court of 
general jurisdiction—the Superior Court—Delaware has various courts of 
limited jurisdiction: the Family Court, the Court of Common Pleas, the 
Justice of the Peace courts, and the Chancery Court.177  The Chancery Court 
explained that the Legislature was likely trying to allocate jurisdiction 
among the state’s courts—not to strip other states’ courts of jurisdiction.178 
The Chancery Court further explained why these recitals of “exclusive” 
jurisdiction are so common in Delaware.179  As the court described, the 
Chancery Court is unusual because it was created by the Delaware 
Constitution, which established the court “to administer the remedies and 
principles of equity.”180  This line was interpreted by the Delaware Supreme 
Court, in DuPont v. DuPont,181 as granting the Chancery Court “residual 
equitable jurisdiction,” meaning the Chancery Court is presumed to have 
jurisdiction over all equitable actions.182  In that case, the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that, in order to divest the Chancery Court of jurisdiction, the 
Legislature must both confer exclusive jurisdiction on another court and 
ensure that the remedies in the alternate forum are equivalent to those 
available in the Chancery Court.183 
This explanation would make sense if the exclusive jurisdiction 
provisions in the statutes at issue named other Delaware courts of limited 
jurisdiction, but the Chancery Court’s explanation with regard to the court’s 
residual jurisdiction is dubious.  In fact, the residual equitable jurisdiction 
 
 173  Id. at 938 (discussing Qualified Dispositions Act, 12 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 3570–3576).  
 174  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(a) (West 2017) (emphasis added); see Ex rel. Daniel, 
98 A.3d at 938. 
 175  Ex rel. Daniel, 98 A.3d at 938–39. 
 176  Id. at 939. 
 177  Id. 
 178  Id. 
 179  Id.  
 180  Id. at 938. 
 181  85 A.2d 724, 729 (Del. 1951).  
 182  Ex rel. Daniel, 98 A.3d at 938. 
 183  Id. at 938–39. 
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seems to cut against the court’s conclusion because, by default, the Chancery 
Court would have subject matter jurisdiction—there would be no need to 
confer it explicit jurisdiction as the Chancery Court is presumed to have 
subject matter jurisdiction in equitable actions.184 
Setting that explanation aside, the Chancery Court also stated that the 
recitals of exclusive jurisdiction were intended by the Legislature to strip the 
Superior Court of jurisdiction, which originally had jurisdiction over 
corporate matters.185  This point echoes the findings of the Anderson court,186 
and makes more sense, especially in light of the Delaware Corporation Law 
Revision Commission’s committee documents.187 
In a 1965 letter from Judge Collins J. Seitz188 to Irving Morris,189 Judge 
Seitz explained how the enactment of section 220 of the General Corporation 
Law would create a new legal right from a remedial right shared by the 
Chancery and Superior Court.190  In a memo written to the Commission just 
 
 184  Id. at 939 (“To divest the Court of Chancery of its power to hear a particular class of 
cases in equity, the General Assembly must both (i) confer ‘exclusively upon some other 
tribunal jurisdiction of causes theretofore heard and determined in the Court of Chancery’ and 
(ii) ensure that the remedies provided by the new tribunal are ‘the equivalent of the remedy 
available in the Court of Chancery.’” (quoting DuPont, 85 A.2d at 729–30)). 
 185  Id. 
 186  Anderson v. Children’s Corner, Inc., No. CV106011812S, 2011 WL 925442, at *2 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2011). 
 187  Cf. Letter from Irving Morris to All Members of the Delaware Corporation Law 
Revision Commission, Stock Holder’s Rights of Inspection (May 6, 1965), 
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.pdf; Letter from 
Collins J. Seitz, Chancellor, Delaware Chancery Court, to Irving Morris (April 22, 1965), 
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.pdf. 
 188  Judge Collins J. Seitz was a well-respected Chancery Court judge whose opinions in 
cases like Belton v. Gebhart were upheld and cited in the Supreme Court’s landmark Brown 
v. Board of Education decision.  Harry Themel, Remembering Collins J. Seitz, Delaware’s 
Greatest Judge, DEL. ONLINE (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/ 
columnists/harry-themal/2016/09/09/remembering-collins-j-seitz-delawares-greatest-
judge/90124096/; Wolfgang Saxon, Judge Collins Seitz Dies at 84; Refuted Segregation in 
Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/21/us/judge-collins-
seitz-dies-at-84-refuted-segregation-in-schools.html?mcubz=3. 
 189  Irving Morris was an esteemed Delaware lawyer who fought to desegregate Delaware 
schools and was a leader in the corporate bar.  See John Paul Stevens, A Struggle with the 
Police & the Law, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Apr. 5, 2012), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2012/04/05/struggle-police-law/; Sam Roberts, Irving 
Morris, Who Fought for Justice Pro Bono, Dies at 90, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/02/us/irving-morris-who-fought-for-justice-pro-bono-
dies-at-90.html. 
 190  Letter from Collins J. Seitz, Chancellor, Delaware Chancery Court, to Irving Morris 2 
(April 22, 1965), http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.pdf 
(“Although he does not say so, he seems to assume that an equitable owner could obtain 
inspection in Chancery.  I am not sure that this is the law.  I believe that inspection in Chancery 
either has to be incidental to a pending case in Chancery or in the law court.  Thus, although 
I could be wrong, I believe the granting of a right to inspect to an equitable owner, apart from 
pending litigation, would amount to the granting of a new right.”). 
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a month later, Morris presumed the Commission understood that the 
enactment of section 220 would create a new right under Delaware Law.191 
This means that without the express grant of jurisdiction, the Chancery 
Court may not have been presumed to have jurisdiction, because the newly 
created right of action, though equitable, had basis only in the common law 
as a remedy.  And, even though the Commission’s documents are not 
explicit, it is evident that the Commission was trying to divest the Superior 
Court—not every other court in the nation—of subject matter jurisdiction.192 
Evidence of this intent is not confined to section 220 either.  As the 
Chancery Court explains in Ex rel. Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust, actions for 
indemnification under section 145 of Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 
the law at issue in the Seventh Circuit case (discussed in Part II.A), was 
originally confined to the Superior Court because the remedy involved 
money damages.193  In 1994, the Delaware Legislature reassigned corporate 
indemnification cases to the Chancery Court through the enactment of 
subsection 145(k), which contains the same recital of “exclusive” 
jurisdiction found throughout Delaware’s General Corporation Law.194 
Finally, in Ex rel. Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust the Delaware Chancery 
Court succinctly found: “When a Delaware state statute assigns exclusive 
jurisdiction to a particular Delaware court, the statute is allocating 
jurisdiction among the Delaware courts.  The state is not making a claim 
against the world that no court outside of Delaware can exercise jurisdiction 
over that type of case.”195  Further, regardless of whether Delaware even has 
the ability to strip its sister states of subject matter jurisdiction, the Chancery 
Court found it (i.e., Delaware) would not arrogate such power to itself.196 
In light of the evidence above and the Delaware Chancery Court’s 
opinion, it is appreciable that the intent of the “exclusive” jurisdiction 
provisions throughout Delaware’s General Corporation Law was merely a 
way of allocating power between the state’s internal courts. Specifically, it 
is apparent that the Delaware Legislature intended to strip its Superior Court 
 
 191  Letter from Irving Morris to All Members of the Delaware Corporation Law Revision 
Commission, Stock Holder’s Rights of Inspection 1 (May 6, 1965), 
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committeedocuments.pdf (“As we know, 
granting an equitable owner of stock or a voting trust certificate holder (legal or equitable) a 
right of inspection would introduce a new right in our law.”). 
 192  See id.; Letter from Collins J. Seitz, Chancellor, Delaware Chancery Court, to Irving 
Morris (April 22, 1965), http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/committee 
documents.pdf. 
 193  Ex rel. Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Tr., 98 A.3d 924, 939 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 194  Id. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(k) (West, Westlaw through 81 Del. Laws 
2018, chs. 200–220), with id §§ 203(e), 205(e), 220(c)–(d). 
 195  Ex rel. Daniel, 98 A.3d at 939 (emphasis in original). 
 196  Id. 
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of subject matter jurisdiction, likely intending to funnel corporate claims 
arising within the state to the state’s Chancery Court, which is highly 
regarded for its expertise in corporate matters.197  This is a much more banal 
interpretation than that of courts reading the provisions as staking a novel, 
covetous claim to all corporate litigation arising under the state’s laws.  
Rather than viewing Delaware as a jealous sister, other states should honor 
Delaware’s interpretation of its own statutes. 
IV. STATE LEGISLATURES CANNOT STRIP SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
FROM COURTS IT HAS NO AUTHORITY OVER 
A much larger and more important question is whether state legislatures 
even have the power within the federal system to strip subject matter 
jurisdiction from federal or state courts.  As explained below, the answer is 
no. 
A. Vertical Jurisdiction Stripping 
It has long been held black letter law that the Constitution does not 
allow states to contract federal jurisdiction.198  Only Congress may alter the 
scope of federal jurisdiction, and the states are powerless to prevent the 
enforcement of rights granted under its laws from being vindicated in federal 
court.199  But no rule is without exceptions.  State courts may contract federal 
jurisdiction indirectly by completely eliminating a right under state law, 
thereby closing both the state and federal courts to any action that would 
have arose from the state law.200 
 
 197  See Haskins, supra note 1. 
 198  17A FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS., State Attempts to Limit Federal Jurisdiction § 4211, 
Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2017) (“Long ago Dean—later Judge—Dobie thought it so 
clear that it could be stated as black-letter law that the jurisdiction of the federal courts ‘cannot 
be limited or taken away by state statutes.’  This is still generally true, but it cannot be stated 
without qualification.”).  See Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v. Whitton, 80 U.S. 270, 286 (1871); 
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1109 (3d Cir. 1995) (collecting 
cases). 
 199  Chicago, 80 U.S. at 286 (“In all cases, where a general right is thus conferred, it can 
be enforced in any Federal court within the State having jurisdiction of the parties.  It cannot 
be withdrawn from the cognizance of such Federal court by any provision of State legislation 
that it shall only be enforced in a State court.  The statutes of nearly every State provide for 
the institution of numerous suits, such as for partition, foreclosure, and the recovery of real 
property in particular courts and in the counties where the land is situated, yet it never has 
been pretended that limitations of this character could affect, in any respect, the jurisdiction 
of the Federal court over such suits where the citizenship of one of the parties was otherwise 
sufficient.”); MCI Telecomm. Corp., 71 F.3d at 1109 (collecting cases). 
 200  See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 188 (1947) (“This pervasive principle of our 
federal law, constitutional and statutory, was thus put by Mr. Justice Holmes: ‘Whatever 
springes the State may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the State confers, 
the assertion of Federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under 
the name of local practice.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
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But it is still black letter law that the Delaware Legislature and, indeed, 
all state legislatures lack the power to strip jurisdiction from federal courts 
by a mere recital stating that one of their courts shall have jurisdiction 
exclusive of all others.201  The United States Supreme Court’s precedent on 
this issue has endured for well over a century: the Constitution simply does 
not allow for a state to condition the vindication of a right granted by its laws 
on the proponent bringing his or her claim in the state’s courts.202 
Despite this, the Supreme Court’s holdings are not absolute; there are 
exceptions which provide a state may exercise exclusive jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, such exercises of “exclusive” jurisdiction are not derived from 
powers of the state, but are based more on tradition and judicial economy.  
This will be addressed in this Subsection C of this Part. 
B. Horizontal Jurisdiction Stripping 
As the Delaware Chancery Court recognized in IMO Daniel Kloiber 
Dynasty Trust the Constitution is not as clear when it comes to the horizontal 
powers of the States.203  That said, the Full Faith and Credit Clause comes 
close.204 
The Supreme Court has long held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
disallows states from trying to divest their sister states of the ability to hear 
claims arising under their laws or refusing to apply the law of their sister 
state where appropriate.205  This interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause has roots in a more than one hundred year-old Supreme Court case, 
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George.206  The case was brought by 
Wiley George, an engineer who, while lying under a locomotive trying to 
repair the brakes, was seriously injured after a defective throttle allowed 
steam to leak into the locomotive engine causing the locomotive to jerk 
forward.207  George brought suit by attachment in Atlanta, Georgia, pursuant 
to section 3910 of the Alabama Code, which made a master liable to the 
employee if he was injured by a defect in the condition of the ways, works, 
 
 201  Chicago, 80 U.S. at 286; MCI Telecomm. Corp., 71 F.3d at 1109 (collecting cases); 
see also Toni 1 Trust, by Tangwall v. Wacker, 413 P.3d 1199, 1207 (Alaska 2018). 
 202  Chicago, 80 U.S. at 286; MCI Telecomm. Corp., 71 F.3d at 1109 (collecting cases); 
Ex rel. Daniel, 98 A.3d 924, 939 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“Any challenge to the federal court’s 
jurisdiction based on Section 145(k) conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of 
Chancery would fail, defeated by the federal diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.”).  
 203  Ex rel. Daniel, 98 A.3d at 939. 
 204  Id. 
 205  Id. at 939–40 (citing Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39, 42–43 (1965); Hughes v. 
Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951)). 
 206  233 U.S. 354, 359–60 (1914). 
 207  Id. at 358. 
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machinery, or plant connected with or used in the business of the master.208  
Tennessee Coal pleaded that George’s action should be dismissed because 
section 6115 of the Alabama Code provided: “‘all actions under § 3910 must 
be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction within the state of Alabama, 
and not elsewhere.’”209  Tennessee Coal argued that to deny effect to 
Alabama’s reservation of exclusive jurisdiction, the Georgia courts would 
defy the principles of the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause.210  
George’s demurral on Tennessee Coal’s motion to dismiss was granted and 
sustained on appeal.211 
Tennessee Coal appealed the case all the way to the United States 
Supreme Court where, writing for the majority, Justice Joseph Lamar 
affirmed George’s demurral.212  Justice Lamar explained that the jurisdiction 
in which a claim may be brought is not part of the cause of action itself.213  
While the court trying a case arising out of the laws of its sister state must 
apply the substantive provisions of that law, venue is not a “substantive” 
aspect of the right.214  The Court stated: 
A state cannot create a . . . cause of action and at the same time 
destroy the right to sue on that . . . cause of action . . . .  
[J]urisdiction is to be determined by the law of the court’s creation 
and cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial operation of a statute 
of another State, even though it created the right of action.215 
The Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause was properly satisfied 
by this approach.216  Interestingly, Justice Holmes dissented, but did not 
write an opinion explaining his position.217 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Tennessee Coal was most recently 
reaffirmed in 2006 in Marshall v. Marshall.218  In Marshall, the United States 
Supreme Court quoted the above language in Tennessee Coal and held that 
the Texas Legislature could not render its courts exclusively competent to 
hear actions arising under the State’s probate code.219 
 
 
 
 208  Id. 
 209  Id. (emphasis added). 
 210  Id. 
 211  Id. 
 212  Tennessee Coal, 233 U.S. at 358, 361. 
 213  Id. at 359. 
 214  Id. 
 215  Id. at 360. 
 216  Id. at 361. 
 217  Id. 
 218  547 U.S. 293, 313–14 (2006). 
 219  Id. 
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The Court, however, did recognize the existence of a “probate 
exception” in Marshall.220  The following Part discusses exceptions which 
permit states to exercise exclusive jurisdiction and whether any such 
exception—or, perhaps, a new exception—ought to be made for corporate 
cases. 
C. Are Corporations Special? 
The Supreme Court derived the probate exception from language in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 and, to quote Justice John Paul Stevens, “incoherent” 
obiter dicta in Markham v. Allen.221  While limiting the largely foregone 
exception, the Court explained that the probate exception to federal 
jurisdiction arises in one of the three following circumstances: (1) where a 
federal court is asked to probate or annul a will; (2) where a federal court is 
asked to administer a decedent’s estate; or (3) where the federal court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction will result in the attempt to dispose of property that 
is in the custody of a state probate court.222  In each of these cases, a federal 
court will not have subject matter jurisdiction.223  In his concurrence, Justice 
Stevens stated the he would have put the probate doctrine to rest by 
“provid[ing] the creature with a decent burial in a grave adjacent to the 
resting place of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.”224 
There is also another exception for “local” causes of action.225  “The 
local action doctrine requires that ‘a local action involving real property . . . 
only be brought within the territorial boundaries of the state where the land 
is located.’”226  Under the local action doctrine, a claim of trespass on a piece 
of real property or recovery of title or possession on that real property may 
be brought only in the situs state of the real estate.227  That exception is 
similar to the “domestic relations exception,” which holds federal courts 
cannot hear cases relating to divorce, alimony, and child custody.228  There 
 
 220  Id. at 308. 
 221  Id. at 315 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 222  Robert M. Harper, The Probate Exception to Federal Jurisdiction—Perplexed No 
Longer—Probate Court Disposes of Property, 23 PROB. & PROP. 60 (Jan./Feb. 2009), 
http://www.farrellfritz.com/wp-content/uploads/art-338.pdf.  As an aside, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine was a doctrine of civil procedure that held federal courts, besides the 
Supreme Court of the United States, should not sit in review of state court decisions.  Rooker-
Feldman Doctrine Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/r/rooker-feldman-doctrine/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2019). 
 223  Harper, supra note 222. 
 224  Marshall, 547 U.S. at 318 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 225  Bailey v. Shell W. E&P, Inc., 609 F.3d 710, 721 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 226  Id. at 721; see Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105, 107 (1895). 
 227  See Ellenwood, 158 U.S. 105 at 107. 
 228  Bradley G. Silverman, Federal Questions and the Domestic-Relations Exception, 125 
YALE L. J. 1364, 1366 (2016). 
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is still an unresolved question as to whether it is a doctrine of venue or subject 
matter jurisdiction,229 but resolving that issue is another Comment. 
No court has ever applied the local action doctrine to a corporation, but, 
for such well-respected courts like the Southern District of New York to 
allow Delaware’s Chancery Court to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over 
corporate matters,230 it bears noting the similarities in legal principle between 
families, estates, real property, and corporations.  Each are special entities 
defined by the laws of their home state, and each are entitled to special 
protections when it comes to administration.  This begs a few questions: 
Ought corporations to be treated with special care?  Should the state of 
incorporation be the only place where venue or subject matter ought to be 
recognized?  Or should it be left to the court in which the action is brought 
to determine if the action is more properly heard in the state of incorporation 
(i.e., rely on traditional principles of forum non conveniens)? 
To a small degree, something akin to the local action doctrine already 
applies to corporations.  Today, courts other than those within the state of 
incorporation lack the practical power to dissolve foreign corporations,231 
though this has not stopped some courts from attempting to fashion remedies 
in lieu of dissolution.232  Many courts that have considered that issue accept 
that the internal affairs doctrine limits their ability to dissolve foreign 
corporations.233  Some courts have even expanded this beyond dissolution: 
“Courts other than those of the State creating it . . . have no visitorial powers 
over such corporation, have no authority to remove its officers, or to punish 
them for misconduct committed in the State which created it, nor to enforce 
a forfeiture of its charter.”234 
 
 229  Bailey, 609 F.3d at 721 n.4 (“This Court has noted that questions remain as to whether 
the local action doctrine runs to the jurisdiction or the venue of a court.”). 
 230  See Transeo S.A.R.L. v. Bessemer Venture Partners VI L.P., 936 F. Supp. 2d 376, 405 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Reserve Sols. Inc. v. Vernaglia, 438 F. Supp. 2d 280, 288–89 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
 231  Peter B. Ladig & Kyle Evans Gay, Judicial Dissolution: Are the Courts of the State 
that Brought You In the Only Courts that Can Take You Out?, 70 BUS. LAW. 1059, 1075 
(2015) (“[F]or an order of judicial dissolution to be effective, an official act must be performed 
in the state of formation.  In Delaware, if a corporation is dissolved by order of the Court of 
Chancery, the Register in Chancery must file the judgment with the Secretary of State.”). 
 232  Peter Mahler, A Split No More: First Department Agrees, No Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction to Dissolve Foreign Business Entities, FARRELLFRITZ (Feb. 29, 2016), 
https://www.nybusinessdivorce.com/2016/02/articles/deadlock/a-split-no-more-first-
department-agrees-no-subject-matter-jurisdiction-to-dissolve-foreign-business-entities/. 
 233  Ladig & Gay, supra note 231, at 1064, 1071 (“Other states’ courts have similarly 
glossed over the distinction between discretion and jurisdiction . . . .  In the other camp are 
courts that have expressly considered the issue at any length.  Those courts uniformly have 
held that they had no power to order dissolution of a foreign entity.”). 
 234  Valone v. Valone, 80 Va. Cir. 45, 47 (2010) (citing Taylor v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life 
Ass’n of New York, 33 S.E. 385, 388 (Va. 1899)). 
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Nevertheless, there is considerable confusion as to which legal 
principle the bar on foreign dissolution is grounded in, specifically, whether 
the bar on dissolution falls under a forum non conveniens analysis, subject 
matter jurisdiction analysis, or a choice of law analysis.235  The bar is, in fact, 
discretionary, meaning it falls under the forum non conveniens analysis.236  
Dissolution is unique, but only because it also has a practical dimension, 
namely, that foreign states lack the actual power to dissolve corporations 
incorporated in other states.237  The lack of power to dissolve a corporation 
is simply a strong consideration in the forum non conveniens analysis—it 
does not mean a foreign court cannot hear the action and attempt to fashion 
an appropriate remedy.238 
In situations where the forum state’s remedial powers are so limited, a 
traditional forum non conveniens analysis will sufficiently safeguard the 
corporation.239  A defendant-corporation could simply make a motion for a 
discretionary dismissal for forum non conveniens rather than a motion for 
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The fact that the Delaware Chancery Court has made a name for itself 
as an expert court in the matter of corporate litigation, while this has, 
understandably, led some courts to make assumptions about the Delaware 
Legislature’s power with respect to corporate law, it would be a mistake to 
create a new exception for exclusive jurisdiction in corporate matters.  To 
create a new subject matter or venue exception in cases involving the internal 
affairs of a corporation would, most immediately, heavily burden the 
Delaware Chancery Court.  The Chancery Court itself has disclaimed 
 
 235  See Ladig & Gay, supra note 231, at 1074 (noting most courts applying the internal 
affairs doctrine view it as a discretionary analysis, and arguing that states other than the state 
of incorporation lack subject matter jurisdiction, because foreign states must give full faith 
and credit to the state of incorporation and the foreign state-judgements interfere with 
privileges granted by the state of incorporation and states like Delaware have explicitly 
reserved exclusive jurisdiction). 
 236  See supra Parts III, IV.A., B. 
 237  See Raharney Capital, LLC v. Capital Stack LLC, 138 A.D.3d 83, 87 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2016) (“An order of dissolution from a New York court would infringe on the sovereign 
authority of another state by, in effect, forcing that state to extinguish an entity formed under 
its own laws.”). 
 238  See id. at 88; Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981) (“[T]he central 
focus of the forum non conveniens inquiry is convenience, . . . dismissal will ordinarily be 
appropriate where trial in the plaintiff’s chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the 
defendant or the court, and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific reasons of 
convenience supporting his choice.”). 
 239  See Ladig & Gay, supra note 231, at 1066 (“While there may be instances in which a 
court can or may exercise jurisdiction in its discretion, there are certain types of cases in which 
there is no discretion involved—those in which the court has no power to grant the relief 
sought.  In cases involving visitorial powers, such as seeking dissolution of a foreign entity, 
the court has no power to enter the relief sought, so there is no question of jurisdiction.”). 
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exclusive jurisdiction,240 and to force it upon the State would not only defy 
expectations, but also overburden the State’s judicial system.  Moreover, 
such an exception would heavily discourage corporate litigation due to the 
potential expense and strain of litigating in a state that could be thousands of 
miles from the state of incorporation. 
And finally, such an exception would lay waste to all choice of law 
provisions in corporate documents and collapse an entire field of corporate 
law.  Rather than leaving corporations the freedom to specify a forum in their 
corporate documents, the state of incorporation would become the 
mandatory site of, perhaps, all litigation related to a corporation’s internal 
affairs.  A corporation doing business in New York might wish to resolve an 
internal dispute within the state, but if it was incorporated elsewhere, under 
a new exception to jurisdiction, the corporation and State of New York 
would lose discretion in settling the dispute in New York.  For some 
corporations, this exception may prove more of a burden than a boon.  The 
creation of such an exception would be a monumental and calamitous shift 
in corporate law, and such a cataclysm should be averted. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite the current confusion, the principles announced by Supreme 
Court ring as true today as they did in the late 1800s.  The fact that the 
Delaware Chancery Court has developed a unique expertise in the field of 
corporate litigation over the last fifty years does not alter the Constitution. 
The current error taking root in certain courts should be deracinated.  State 
legislatures lack the power to strip other states’ courts of subject matter 
jurisdiction or the power to contract federal subject matter jurisdiction.  And, 
finally, while corporations are undoubtedly special legal entities, they are not 
so special that a new exception to venue or subject matter jurisdiction needs 
to be carved out that mandates all claims against a corporate be brought in 
their state of incorporation.  Such a shift would be overly burdensome for the 
courts, potential litigants, and the corporations themselves.  It is more in line 
with American jurisprudence to employ a forum non conveniens analysis in 
cases where corporations foreign to the forum state assert that their interests 
will be prejudiced or that the court lacks sufficient power to settle the dispute. 
 
 
 240  Ex rel. Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Tr., 98 A.3d 924, 939 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
